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South Korea has strong laws and practice in criminal
defamation and insult, which have affected the creation of equally
strong criminal laws and practice in candidate defamation and
candidate insult law. Many defamation cases were filed to protect
the reputation of public officials, while practically all of the
candidate defamation and insult indictments are aimed at protecting
the reputation of the candidates for public office. Such a trend has
been found at odds with an international human rights standard on
freedom of speech that has consistently warned against the antidemocratic potentials of criminal defamation and insult laws. In this
Article, the authors engage in an empirical study of South Korean
criminal prosecutions for candidate defamation and candidate insult,
respectively, to test a postulate underlying human rights standards,
namely that criminal defamation law has been abused for political
purposes, as the renowned Leflar study has shown in the U.S. context
half a century ago, giving rise to such cases as New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan and Garrison v. Louisiana.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Two hundred years before John Milton published
Areopagitica (1644), the first explicit tract on freedom of speech,
King Sejong the Great of the Chosun Dynasty was famous for
refusing to punish people arrested for seditious remarks. For instance,
in 1433, when a debtor falling behind on repayments of a government
loan was brought to him for openly complaining that “[t]his King’s
throne will not last long. A new king will rise from the Western
Province,” King Sejong said “people are bound to blame others when
things don’t turn out the way they want. . . . Likewise, he is just
blaming me for his hardship. There is no harm done to me” and
refused to punish him. 1 Indeed, as early as 1428, Sejong had already
issued a judgment that “no one should be punished for criticizing
government” on the case of a person who called his throne “the Dark
Age.” 2 Often he implored to his ministers, “I am neither virtuous, nor
skillful in administration. Some of my acts will surely contravene
Heaven’s wills. You should look hard for my shortcomings and
thereby help me reflect on and act rightfully on Heaven’s lessons.” 3
He even scolded the ministers calling for austerity: “You want me to
punish the people just for speaking their minds truthfully about me?
Are you trying to push me into blind ignorance by keeping me from
hearing from down under about the real conditions?” 4 His throne was
1 SEJONG JANGHEON D AEWANG S ILLOK [V ERITABLE R ECORDS OF K ING S EJONG ] bk. 18,
vol. 59, at 45 [hereinafter S EJONG SILLOK], http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kda_11503013_002
[http://perma.cc/P9BN-AP8M] (statements on Mar. 13, 1433).
2 SEJONG SILLOK bk. 13, vol. 40, at 4, http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kda_11004021_002
[http://perma.cc/GXD9-F2XW] (statements on Apr. 21, 1428).
3 SEJONG S ILLOK bk. 10, vol. 30, at 21, http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kda_ 10712008_
001 [http://perma.cc/22PS-TSGZ] (statements on Dec. 8, 1425).
4 SEJONG S ILLOK bk. 19, vol. 61, at 19, http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kda_ 11507027_
001 [http://perma.cc/5R4G-CRAW] (statements on July 27, 1433).
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in a way representative of Chosun Dynasty’s attitudes toward the
relationship between free speech and good government: every king’s
remark in court was recorded verbatim by official recorders who were
guaranteed independence and confidentiality and, most importantly,
published the records for the eyes of all so that people of the next
generation could use them to monitor and criticize the previous king’s
performance on the basis of the records not adulterated in any way by
the kings. Regardless of what little freedom of speech commoners
enjoyed, the ruling elite attempted to maintain a healthy dialogue
between information and governance.
Unfortunately, despite this head start and even after
modernization and the adoption of the more “advanced” Western
system, freedom of speech in Korea seems to be on shaky ground, 5
especially because of the very laws constitutive of the Western
system, such as criminal defamation, insult, and “truth defamation.”
While most of these laws were abolished, became obsolete, or were
“tamed” in their countries of origin 6 over time, their Korean
counterparts 7 are still being vigorously enforced in modern-day
Korea, as shown below. The epitome of the instability was the
prosecution of the Japanese newspaper Sankei Shinbun correspondent
5 FREEDOM HOUSE, South Korea, in FREEDOM ON THE N ET 2012: A G LOBAL
ASSESSMENT OF INTERNET AND DIGITAL M EDIA 456 (Sanja Kelly et al. eds., 2012).
6 Richard N. Winfield & Kristin Mendoza, The Abolition Movement: Decriminalizing
Defamation and Insult Laws, 25 COMM. LAW., Fall 2007, at 7, 7–9.
7 Hyeongbeop [Criminal Act], Act No. 293, Sept. 18, 1953, amended by Act. No. 5057,
Dec. 29, 1995, art. 310 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute online
database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/lawPrint.do?hseq=28627 [http://perma.cc/
W4S9-X7ZU] (“If the facts alleged under Article 307 (1) are true and solely for the public
interest, the act shall not be punishable.”) [hereinafter Criminal Act];

(1) A person who defames another by publicly alleging facts shall be
punished by imprisonment or imprisonment without prison labor for not
more than two years or by a fine not exceeding five million won . . . .(2)
A person who defames another by publicly alleging false facts shall be
punished by imprisonment for not more than five years, suspension of
qualifications for not more than ten years, or a fine not exceeding ten
million won.
Id. art. 307, translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute online database (alteration in
original), https://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/lawPrint.do?hseq=28627 [http://perma.cc/
6GSS-LDZE]; Id. art. 311, translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute online
database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/lawPrint.do?hseq=28627 [http://perma.cc/
6GSS-LDZE] (“A person who publicly insults another shall be punished by imprisonment
or imprisonment without prison labor for not more than one year or by a fine not exceeding
two million won.”).
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for defaming Korea’s president, which fortunately ended in a notguilty verdict. 8
These laws also gave rise to parallels in election regulation,
such as crimes of “candidate slander” 9 and “false election speech.” 10
It should be noted that although “false election speech” covers both
false self-aggrandizement by the candidates themselves and false
accusations against other candidates, as this study reveals that most
indicted cases involved the latter. So instead, we will call it
“candidate defamation.”
Also, “candidate slander” punishes
spreading facts about a candidate but the prosecutors and courts are
using it as a “candidate insult” law whereby hateful epithets against
candidates are punished. Hence, we will call it “candidate insult.”
A strong impetus for “taming” or otherwise containing
criminal defamation laws came from a 1954 U.S. study done by
Robert Leflar who found that nearly half the defamation prosecutions
between 1920s and 1956 were political in nature, i.e., incumbents
with influence over prosecutors attempted to suppress opposition
8

Choe Sang-hun, Court Acquits Journalist Accused of Defaming South Korean
President, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/18/world/asia/
south-korea-park-geun-hye-defamation-verdict.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/U2ZX-TBUB].
9

Any person who slanders a candidate (including a person who intends
to be a candidate), his/her spouse, lineal ascendants or descendants,
siblings by pointing out any fact openly through a speech, broadcast,
newspaper, communication, magazine, poster, propaganda document, or
other means, with the intention of getting elected, or getting another
person to be or not to be elected, shall be punished by imprisonment with
prison labor for not more than three years or by a fine not exceeding five
million won: Provided, That where it is a true fact and concerns a public
interest, he/she shall not be punished.
Gongjikseongeobeop [Public Official Election Act], Act No. 7681, Aug. 4, 2005, as
amended, art. 251 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute online
database (emphasis added), http://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=35856&
lang=ENG [http://perma.cc/TF3W-APVU] [hereinafter Public Official Election Act].
10

(2) Any person who publishes, or makes another person publish, any
false facts on a candidate, his/her spouse, lineal ascendants or
descendants, or siblings, so as to be unfavorable to the candidate . . . ,
with the intention of stopping the candidate from being elected, or
persons who possess a propaganda document in which a false fact is
entered with the intention of distributing it, shall be punished by
imprisonment with prison labor for not more than seven years or by a
fine of not less than five million won nor more than 30 million won.
Id. art. 250.

http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss3/4
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candidates. 11
The study influenced the Supreme Court’s
deliberations on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 12 and Garrison v.
Louisiana 13 a year later—the two pillars that established the
relationship between democracy and modern defamation laws by
making it very difficult for public officials either to become a plaintiff
in civil court or influence prosecutors into suppressing their criticism.
A similar empirical study was done about half a century later and
reconfirmed Leflar’s earlier findings. 14
This paper attempts a similar empirical study of the current
candidate defamation and insult prosecutions in South Korea between
2005 and 2015. This study tests the postulate that criminal
defamation law is indeed subject to political abuse by the incumbents
through their control over prosecutors. In Part I, the paper surveys
Korean law and practice in criminal defamation and positions it in
international comparison. In Part II, the paper surveys Korean
candidate defamation/insult laws and compares them against selected
countries. In Part III, the methods and findings of the empirical
analysis are presented.

II.

CRIMINAL DEFAMATION PROSECUTION IN KOREA:
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
1.

Volume and Nature of Criminal Defamation

In Korea, private persons are vigorously subjected to criminal
prosecution for defamation, often in defense of public officials’
reputation. 15 According to the non-profit organization Article 19,
during a twenty-month period between January 1, 2005 and August

11

Robert A. Leflar, The Social Utility of the Criminal Law of Defamation, 34 TEX. L.
REV. 984, 985 (1956).
12 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
13 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
14 Russell Hickey, A Compendium of U.S. Criminal Libel Prosecutions: 1990–2002,
LIBEL D EF. R ESOURCE CTR. BULL., Mar. 2002, at 97.
15 See Stephan Haggard & Jong-sung You, Freedom of Expression in South Korea, 45
J. CONTEMP . ASIA 167 (2015); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Report of the Special Rapporteur
on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank
La Rue, on His Mission to the Republic of Korea (6–17 May 2010), ¶ 89, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/17/27/Add.2 (Mar. 21, 2011), https://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/5006597.04208
374.html [https://perma.cc/XV2U-HFZ4] (recommending the removal of defamation as a
criminal offense from the Criminal Act).
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2007, only 146 people have been incarcerated for defamation, 16 not
including Korea, where according to the congressional disclosure
made by the Supreme Court, 136 people were incarcerated over a
fifty-five month period between January 1, 2005 through July 2009.17
This suggests that Korea took up close to 30% of all people
incarcerated in the relevant periods. This is in stark contrast to the
fact that most developed countries have abolished (or engaged in the
process of abolishing) criminal prosecution for defamation,18 due to
a concern that the incumbent government or other powerful
individuals might influence prosecutors to suppress their opposition
or critics—that is, using the taxpayers’ money for political purposes
under the pretext of defamation prosecution. 19 For instance, Japan
retains criminal defamation 20 on the books but uses imprisonment as
punishment sparingly (one to four cases annually, according to the
Article 19 statistics). Germany is the exception,21 but most of that
country’s convictions for criminal defamation and insult represent
fines with almost no actual incarcerations while the substantial
number of actual incarcerations in Korea are many times longer than
six months.
The trend continues to date and with greater intensity. For
instance, in 2011, 3,340 people were tried for criminal defamation
16 See Advocacy: Defamation Map, ARTICLE 19 (2007), http://www.article19.org/
advocacy/defamationmap/overview.html (no longer available; last visited May 30, 2009)
(alternatively available at https://web.archive.org/web/20080124075739/http://www.
article19.org/advocacy/defamationmap/overview.html) [https://perma.cc/6RXU-4D9W].
17 Jung Jae Ho, Yichunsuk “Myungyehwesonbupjoe, 2-Nyeonsae 46% Jeungga” [MP
Lee Chun-Seok, “46% Rise in Defamation Crimes in 2 Years”], D AUM N EWS (Oct. 19, 2009),
http://v.media.daum.net/v/20101006161113668 [http://perma.cc/MG4S-PP9Q].
18 See Winfield & Mendoza, supra note 6, at 9 (explaining that “various international
organizations and authorities” have criticized and attacked criminal defamation laws “as
violating the rights of free press and the rights of people to receive news and information.”);
CONFERENCE R EPORT, ORG. FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, LIBEL AND INSULT
LAWS: WHAT MORE C AN BE DONE TO DECRIMINALIZE L IBEL AND R EPEAL INSULT LAWS?,
www.osce.org/item/3544.html (alternatively available at https://web.archive.org/web/2009
1005111908/http://www.osce.org/documents/rfm/2003/11/3346_en.pdf) [https://perma.cc/
LZ86-VUQE].
19 Gregory C. Lisby, No Place in the Law: The Ignominy of Criminal Libel in American
Jurisprudence, 9 COMM. L. & POL’ Y 433, 477 (2004).
20 KEIHŌ [K EIHŌ] [Pen. C.], Law No. 45 of 1907, art. 230 (Japan), http://www.japanese
lawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=1960&vm=04&re=02 [https://perma.cc/N3HZ-LWMR].
21 International Press Institute, IPI Special Investigation: The Application of Criminal
Defamation Laws in Europe, MEDIALAWS D ATABASE (Sept. 15, 2015), http://legaldb.
freemedia.at/2015/09/15/ipi-special-investigation-the-application-of-criminal-defamationlaws-in-europe/ [http://perma.cc/NY5X-7J7E].
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and forty-seven were actually incarcerated (this is a conservative
estimate, since the number does not include sixty-three who received
deferred sentences).22 In 2010, a total of 2,193 people were indicted
for defamation, out of which forty-three incarcerations for
defamation resulted.
As U.N. Special Rapporteur of Freedom of Expression and
Opinion Frank La Rue pointed out in his report on Korea, many of
these criminal prosecutions are cases where private persons are
subjected to criminal prosecution for defamation in defense of public
officials’ reputation. 23 The political nature of these prosecutions is
evinced by the fact that most cases resulted in withdrawal, dismissal,
or not-guilty judgments, leaving only indelible chilling effects on the
populace. 24
Famously, in March 2009, six television documentary
producers of PD’s Notebook were prosecuted for producing and
broadcasting an investigative piece on the danger of mad cow disease
associated with American beef. 25 The prosecutors charged that
22

2012 S ABEOB YEONGAM [2012 LEGAL YEAR BOOK], ch. 5, 876 (2012),
http://file.scourt.go.kr//AttachDownload?path=001&seqnum=66&gubun=10&file=144411
4039639_154719.pdf&downFile=05_2012%B3%E2_%C7%FC%BB%E7_%C0%CE%B
D%C5%BA%B8%C8%A3.pdf [http://perma.cc/G7EB-W839].
23 U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 15, ¶¶ 25, 89.
24 PEOPLE’ S SOLIDARITY FOR PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY [PSPD], PAK G EON- HYE
CHEONGBU UI K UNGMIN IBMAGEUM S ARYE ISIP-I SEON [THE 22 CASES OF THE
GOVERNMENT’S STRATEGIC PROSECUTIONS AGAINST P UBLIC P ARTICIPATION AND
EXPRESSION] (2015), http://www.peoplepower21.org/?module=file&act=procFileDown
load&file_srl=1359076&sid=0dbc93fdbe92d151cc555e52838b188f&module_srl=505220
[http://perma.cc/DV95-4LEK].
25 PD
Notebook:
Gingeupchwijae,
Miguksan
Soegogi,
Gwanyeon
Gwangoobyeongaeseo Anjeonhanga? (television broadcast Apr. 29, 2008); PD Notebook:
Miguksan Soegogi, Gwanyeon Gwangoobyeongaeseo Anjeonhanga? (television broadcast
May 13, 2008). On June 20, 2008, the producers of a television documentary PD Notebook
were accused of defamation by the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery for
producing and having broadcast a special episode on mad cow disease and its occurrence in
the U.S. beef on April 30, 2008. PD Notebook is a popular weekly documentary by MBC,
one of the three premier broadcasting stations. The theory was that the documentary
exaggerated the susceptibility of U.S. beef to mad cow diseases, thereby derogating the
reputation of the agricultural minister who had decided to import U.S. beef.
The prosecutors accepted the accusation by the agricultural minister and announced
on July 29, 2008 that the PD Notebook episode includes “19 different distortions.” PD
Sucheop 19 Got Uidojeok Waegok [Intentional Distortion of 19 PD Notebooks] http://news.
chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2008/07/30/2008073000061.html [https://perma.cc/5BVHB6VJ]. One such distortion is as follows: the mother of a human mad cow disease victim in
the televised interview uttered in English the similar sounding name of another disease as
the reason for her daughter’s death but the Korean subtitle said ‘a mad cow disease.’ The
producers changed the Korean translation because the mother used the names of the two
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defaming the American beef actually defamed the agricultural
minister who found the cows appropriate for import into the
country. The producers were found not guilty through all three stages
of the court. 26 But the fact of the prosecution alone chilled all other
diseases interchangeably in previous conversations and there were ample circumstances to
believe that the mother meant ‘mad cow disease.’ Even so, the prosecutors appear to believe,
the mother’s mistake should not have been corrected by the producers to augment the
emotional value of the mother’s interview. Another alleged distortion is the comparison of
Koreans’ genetic susceptibility to mad cow disease to other races, which shows Koreans to
be three times more susceptible. The prosecutors claim that the comparison left out other
relevant factors. In general, the prosecutors’ investigations reveal at most sensationalizing
and editorializing of the data but not outright falsities.
On December 29, 2008, the prosecutor in charge of the PD Notebook case resigned
for an unknown reason. It has been rumored that he has disagreed with the top leaders of
the Prosecutors’ Office and has refused to indict the producers for the reason that PD
Notebook constitutes criticism of a government policy and therefore cannot be punished for
defamation of government officials in accordance with freedom of speech. In the end, the
case resulted in not-guilty verdict at the Supreme Court. Supreme Court [S. Ct.],
2010Do17237, Sept. 2, 2011 (S. Kor.)
26 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Do17237, Sept. 2, 2011 (S. Kor.) (author translation).
The Court spoke on the lack of the requisite malice as follows:
In media defamation cases, the standard of review varies depending on
whether the supposed victim of the media report is a public figure or a
private figure, whether the report concerns matters of public interest or
matters of purely private domain, or whether the report, seen objectively,
concerns matters of public and social nature that people must know and
therefore contributes to the formation of public opinion or open
discussion, etc. As to the speeches belonging to private domain,
protection of reputation may prevail over freedom of press. As to the
matters of public and social nature, the restriction on freedom of press
must be eased (See Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 97Hun-Ma265,
June. 24, 1999 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2000Da37524 & 37531,
Jan. 22, 2002 (S. Kor.)). Especially, matters concerning the
government’s or state agencies’ policy making or performance of their
duties must be subject to people’s constant monitoring and critique,
which can be properly conducted only if the freedom is sufficiently
guaranteed to the press whose main duties are such monitoring and
critiquing. The government or state agencies cannot be deemed the
victims of criminal defamation, and therefore, even if a media report
mainly concerning the government’s or state agencies’ policy-making
or work performance reduces the social reputation of the official
involved in such policy-making or work, such report cannot be held to
defame the official unless such report is malicious or a very rash attack
against the official as an individual (Supreme Court [S. Ct.],
2002Da62494, July 22, 2003; Supreme Court [S. Ct.] 2004Da35199,
May 12, 2006, (S. Kor.)).
The lower court found some part of the defendant’s media report to be a
false proposition incongruent with objective facts but ruled against
attributing the crime of defamation to the defendants for the following
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broadcasters and television producers into silence for close to five
years since then and to date. No longer do we see many television
programs healthily critiquing government policies. Especially
chilling about the logic of the indictment was that, even a report on
consumer products could be closely inspected for any error or
inaccuracy by prosecutors to see if such errors or inaccuracies might
somehow affect the reputation of government officials who had
commended such products.
In 2009, Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon filed a charge against, and
prosecutors indicted, the merchants leasing store space from the city
for demonstrating against and criticizing the city’s new lease policies
allegedly favoring big businesses. 27 In 2009, the National Tax
Services filed a charge against, and prosecutors indicted, one of its
employees for revealing a political scandal of its Director.28 These
two cases also resulted in acquittals up through the Supreme Court.
Additionally, in 2010, Shin Sang-chul, the operator of online
media Surprise, was indicted for alleging that the government
investigation into the sinking of ROKS Corvette Cheonan was a
cover-up,29 and his trial is ongoing. In April 2014, Hong Ga-hye, a
reasons: the overall intent and content of the report is to point out the
problems with American beef’s food safety and the government’s beef
trade negotiation and to criticize the Korean government for rushing to
conclude the negotiation without review of sufficient time. Considering
that the report concerns the matters of public and social nature
contributing to the opinion-making and open discussion on the
government policies on national food stocks, the standard of finding
defamation should be different from the one applicable to the matter of
private nature. The part of the report found to be false is about American
beef’s communicability of mad cow disease and therefore is not directly
related to the official’s reputation. Neither can it be viewed as malicious
or an attack prominently lacking substance against the supposed victim.
Under these circumstances, the defendants cannot be attributed
knowledge that they were defaming the victims and cannot be held to
have the mens rea.
We find the lower court’s decision proper . . . .
27 PSPD, CH’ EONGWADAE D EUNG’ E C HINAN O NYEONGAN K UNGMIN I BMAGEUM
SOSONG H YEONHWANG POGOSEO M IT P’YEONJI C HEONDAL [R EPORTS AND R ESPONSE
AGAINST THE BLUE HOUSE ON L AWSUITS SHUTTING PEOPLE UP THROUGHOUT THE L AST FIVE
YEARS] (2013), http://www.peoplepower21.org/PSPD_press/1032358 [http://perma.cc/
FUH8-SF7J].
28 Id.
29 Barbara Demick & John M. Glionna, Doubts Surface on North Korea’s Role in Ship
Sinking, L.A. TIMES (July 23, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/23/world/la-fgkorea-torpedo-20100724 [http://perma.cc/YQ5R-U9T2]; see also You Jong-sung, The
Cheonan Incident and the Declining Freedom of Expression in South Korea, 39 ASIAN
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volunteer rescuer, was indicted for falsely accusing the government
rescuers of the tragic Sewol ferry of incompetence and jailed for a
little over 100 days before being found not guilty. Her appellate trials
are ongoing. 30 Then, in October 2014, a Sankei Shinbun
correspondent was indicted for defamation for spreading people’s
doubts about President Park’s whereabouts during the seven hours
spanning the sinking of the tragic Sewol Ferry, and was later found
not guilty.31
Even without indictments, the mere charges of defamation
filed by public officials add to the chilling effects. In 2008, the Prime
Minister’s Office filed a charge against Kim Jong-ik, who posted a
video clip pejoratively parodying the then President Lee Myungbak,32 though the charge was deferred indefinitely by the prosecutors.
In 2010, the Minister of Culture filed a charge of defamation against
a netizen for posting a video clip of the Minister trying to hug the
figure skating star Kim Yu-na, only to be shunned by her.33 That
charge was also dropped by the prosecutors.
Also, in 2012, the notorious National Intelligence Services
34
(NIS) filed charges against three different groups of individuals
(Pyo Chang-won, Nakkomsu members, Suh Young-Suk) for alleging
that NIS secretly financed an online campaign supporting the
conservative candidate Park Geun-Hye in the 2012 Presidential
Election.35 While the prosecutors are still investigating those charges,
some of the NIS officials were themselves actually indicted for

PERSPECTIVE, 195 (2015) (discussing the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan and
factors that might contribute to the erosion of press freedom in South Korea).
30 Korean Court Acquits Woman of Lying about Ferry Rescue, KOREA TIMES (Jan. 9,
2015), http://www.koreatimesus.com/korean-court-acquits-woman-of-lying-about-ferryrescue/ [http://perma.cc/A7S4-NR6W].
31 Japan Journalist Found Not Guilty of Defaming S Korean President, BBC (Dec. 17,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35118701 [http://perma.cc/W9W4-E3E6].
32 The Prime Minister’s Office “Civilian Illegal Inspections,” KYUNGHANG S HINMUN
(Mar. 3, 2012), http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=20120305030
0235 [https://perma.cc/Q8XE-TWW7].
33 Kwon Mee-yoo, Culture Minister Yu Upset at Yu-na Video, KOREA TIMES (Mar. 17,
2010), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/03/117_62548.html [http://
perma.cc/7D3B-XVT6].
34 Red-Handed, ECONOMIST (Mar., 21, 2014), http://www.economist.com/blogs/
banyan/2014/03/south-korean-intelligence [http://perma.cc/PEF3-LBMR].
35 PSPD, supra note 27.
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actively conducting other more systematic and extensive online
campaigns to manipulate public opinions. 36
The very use of criminal defamation has been condemned by
international human rights bodies, including U.N. Human Rights
Committee in its 2011 General Comment 34,37 for being abused by
authoritarian rulers as pretexts for oppressing opponents, especially
by misusing prosecutorial resources paid for by taxpayers. The
European Court of Human Rights has struck down almost all national
courts’ criminal judgments against journalists who criticized the
government or high officials, for being too excessive or not

36

National Assembly and presidential elections in 2012 were viewed as
free and fair; however, during the year there was increasing evidence of
broad efforts by government agencies to use social networking services
to interfere in the elections in favor of candidates from the incumbent
conservative party. Prosecutors indicted former NIS chief Won Sei-hoon
for violating the NIS law and the Public Official Election Act, charging
that the NIS agents tried to sway voter opinion through more than 22
million postings on the internet, on Twitter, and on other social media
sites. The indictment stated the NIS began online activities to influence
politics in 2009, and interfered in the 2010 local elections and the 2011
Seoul mayoral election. These activities were, however, outside the sixmonth statute of limitations for the election law. Authorities indicted at
least five other NIS officials on similar charges. Prosecutors indicted
former Seoul Metropolitan Police Chief Kim Yong-pan on charges of
violating the Police Officers Act and the Public Official Election Act for
abusing his authority in hampering a police investigation into the NIS,
which led to a police announcement three days before the presidential
election that claimed NIS was clear of wrongdoing.
U.S. D EP’T OF STATE, 2013 H UMAN RIGHTS R EPORT : REPUBLIC OF KOREA (2014),
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2013/eap/220204.htm, [http://perma.cc/DJ5W-ZPX2].
37 U.N. Human Rights Comm., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
General Comment No. 34, Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc
CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2BH7-ML84] (“States parties should consider the decriminalization of
defamation and, in any case, the application of the criminal law should only be countenanced
in the most serious of cases and imprisonment is never an appropriate penalty.”).
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respecting people’s right to know. 38 Of course, the strongest reaction
came from the United States early in Garrison v. Louisiana.39
2.

Truth Defamation40

Criminal prosecution in Korea also applies to truthful
statements (or statements not proven to be false)—even in the
absence of privacy concerns, in contravention to the Special
Rapporteur’s 41 and U.N. Human Rights Committee’s 42 specific
38

See Lyashko v. Ukraine, App. No. 21040/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-76714 [http://perma.cc/QU7P-Y5MH] (regarding a
reporter criticizing the Prime Minister); Scharsach v. Austria, 2003-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 123,
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Reports_Recueil_2003-XI.pdf [http://perma.cc/C7M8JEWS] (regarding a reporter calling a far-right politician “closet Nazi,” fine overturned);
Colombani v. Fr., 2002-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2002), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-60532
[http://perma.cc/8PQL-Y4H3] (regarding a reporter scorning Moroccan government’s drug
combat policy); Unabhängige Initiative Informationsvielfalt v. Austria, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R.
271, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Reports_Recueil_2002-I.pdf [http://perma.cc/
HH8H-3TMH] (regarding a reporter comparing an Austrian politician’s immigration policy
to that of Nazi’s); Dalban v. Rom., 1999-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 221, http://www.echr.
coe.int/Documents/Reports_Recueil_1999-VI.pdf [http://perma.cc/44VB-V49A] (regarding
a reporter revealing a public agency’s corruptions); Nilsen v. Nor, 1999-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R.
57, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Reports_Recueil_1999-VIII.pdf [http://perma.cc/
8UPW-U8MH]; De Haes v. Belg., App. No. 19983/92, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1997), http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58015 [http://perma.cc/6RD2-TSMD] (regarding a critique of a
judge’s divorce judgment); Oberschlick v. Austria (No. 2), App. No. 20834/92, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(1997),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58044
[http://perma.cc/TUP2-RN8J]
(regarding a reporter calling a conservative politician “a fool”); Castells v. Spain, App. No.
11798/85, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1992), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57772 [http://perma.cc/
U9WJ-Y3SX] (regarding a report on murder in 1977 Basque); Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Ice.,
App. No. 13778/88, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1992), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57795
[http://perma.cc/JUE5-Y7VF]; Barfod v. Den., App. No. 11508/85, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1989),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57430 [http://perma.cc/X5SM-M3YN]; Lingens v.
Austria, App. No. 9815/82, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1986), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57523
[http://perma.cc/8SAD-PFUS] (regarding a reporter criticizing former Austrian Prime
Minister “opportunistic” and “immoral”). See also Dan Kozlowski, “For the Protection of
the Reputation or Rights of Others”: The European Court of Human Rights’ Interpretation
of the Defamation Exception in Article 10(2), 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 133 (2006).
39 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
40 Criminal Act, supra note 7 art. 307(1).
41 U.N. Human Rights Comm., Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, on His
Mission to Italy (11–18 November 2013), ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/30/Add.3 (Apr. 29,
2014) (“The Special Rapporteur reiterated that for a statement to be considered defamatory,
it must be false, it must injure another person’s reputation and it must be made with malicious
intent to cause injury to another individual’s reputation.”).
42 U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 37, (alteration in original) (“All . . . penal
defamation laws . . . should include such defences as the defence of truth . . . .”). Upon
interview of the members of the Human Rights Committee on October 15, 2016, the
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mandates to exempt such statements. Defendants can only escape
liability by proving that the statements were made solely for public
interest, a burden of proof that is difficult to sustain 43 unless the
speaker is from a media organization. For instance, the Supreme
Court refused the public interest defense of a worker making a
truthful statement about his employer’s non-payment of his wages on
the grounds that the worker intended to pressure the employer into
paying his wages, i.e., the public interest was not his sole motive.44
The same reasoning probably explains the Court’s decision
convicting a drug wholesaler who truthfully complained about the
pharmaceutical companies’ unfair trade practices. 45 The practical
effect of this truth defamation is that an individual who has
encountered corruption in the government or other powerful entities
cannot freely share her knowledge with others for fear that she may
not be able to sustain the burden of proving that the “public interest”
was her “sole motive.”
In a suicide of a celebrity actress who left behind a document
that reveals corruption involving sexual briberies and sexual
coercions in the entertainment and media industry and enumerates as
the main culprits certain powerful individuals, almost no major media
agencies reported the real names of the people listed, although it was
clear to many that such whistleblowing would be certainly in the
public interest. 46
Criminal prosecution of truthful statements has allowed, for
instance, the overreaching interpretation by the Korean
Communication Standards Commission (“KCSC”) against the Daum
Agora petition page, which only restated Governor Kim Moon-soo’s
own allegedly unpatriotic words and added at the end the petitioner’s
own negative evaluation of Kim’s statements. 47 Again, such
members, though wishing not to be named, agreed that the defense of truth must be effective
without any other condition such as “public interest.”
43 Criminal Act, supra note 7, art. 310.
44 Supreme Court [S.Ct.], 2004Do3912, Oct. 15, 2004 (S.Kor.).
45 Supreme Court [S.Ct.], 2004Do1497, May 28, 2004 (S.Kor.).
46 Justin McCurry, Storm in South Korea over Jang Ja-yeon’s Suicide, GUARDIAN (Mar.
31, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/01/south-korea-entertaiment-jangjayeon [http://perma.cc/VH7Z-NZMK].
47 On January 2, 2009, Governor Kim Moon-soo during a public speech asked
rhetorically, “Would today’s Korea have been possible had she not gone through the
Japanese colonial period, the division, and the war?” A public uproar followed, criticizing
Governor Kim for rationalizing the nation’s tragedies. One individual started an online
petition on a Daum Agora site, where Governor Kim’s remarks, quoted word-for-word, were
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discussion of a high official’s historical position would have qualified
as spoken “solely for the public interest.”
Countries such as Norway, Netherlands, Denmark, Finland,
and Switzerland48 retain truth defamation law, which requires public
interest as an element of defense. However, they apply it to
disclosure of private facts, not to protect a malfeasor from
reputational loss. In Korea, truth defamation law is actually used by
a malfeasor to prevent people from talking about his or her
malfeasance. For instance, a member of an elders association was
found guilty of truth defamation when he alerted other members
about violent behavior that the association’s officer exhibited toward
other members with no intention of keeping it private. 49 In fact, the
officer’s companion was found guilty of battery for her conduct
during the violent encounter.
How Sullivan has been embraced by Korean courts has been
masterfully documented by Professor Youm Kyu Ho. 50 However, as
he himself admits, adoption of the Sullivan-like rule has not resulted
in a judicial battleground favorable for media organizations. 51 One
of the reasons is that truth defamation has silently distorted the burden
of proof in favor of the prosecutor/plaintiff in “falsity defamation”
cases, the staple of defamation litigation around the world: if one will
be held liable regardless of the veracity of the statement, judges have
followed by criticism, such as “nation-destroying remarks” and a plea for resignation. Other
netizens could express their agreement or disagreement with the plea for resignation by
posting replies on the page. KCSC censored the petition page for “defamation,”
contradicting even established principles. A principle that expression of mere opinions
cannot be imposed any legal liability has been firmly established and several times
reconfirmed by the highest courts of the country. So has been the principle that a true
statement made solely for public interest (e.g., a statement challenging the qualification of a
public official) cannot be held legally liable. Park Kyung-Sin, The “Sin of Truth
Propagation” and Governor Kim Moon-su, HANKYOREH (Feb. 8, 2009), http://www.hani.
co.kr/arti/opinion/column/337639.html [https://perma.cc/J4AA-F8QR].
48 Legal Provisions Concerning Defamation, Libel and Insult, in DEFAMATION AND
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 51 (Council of Eur. 2003), https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublic
CommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680483b2d#search
=%22Legal%20Provisions%20Concerning%20Defamation%22 [http://perma.cc/W7PK268R].
49 Supreme Court [S.Ct.], 2012Do11914, Mar. 28, 2013 (S. Kor.). See also Incheon
District Court [Dist. Ct.], 2012Go-Dan374, May 30, 2012 (S. Kor.); Incheon District Court
[Dist. Ct.], 2012No1630, Sept. 21, 2012 (S. Kor.).
50 Kyu Ho Youm, The “Actual Malice” of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan: A Free
Speech Touchstone in a Global Century, 19 COMM. L. & POL’Y. 185, 201–03 (2014).
51 Kyu Ho Youm, Libel Law and the Press: U.S. and South Korea Compared, 13 UCLA
PAC. BASIN L. J. 231, 262–63 (1995).
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little incentive to strictly impose the plaintiffs’ or prosecutors’ burden
of proving the falsity of the statement. Therefore, trials end up
focusing on whether speakers had “sufficient bases” for their
statements. This in turn has the effect of chilling the dissemination
of often naturally ‘imperfect’ claims or evidence of corruption, as the
speakers can be criminally punished in the event that they cannot
prove the truth of those claims.
For instance, a prominent congressman Roh Hwe-chan was
found guilty52 for simply disclosing the names of the prosecutors who
were named in an illegally wiretapped conversation between highlevel Samsung Group officials planning bribery payments to the
prosecutors because he could not prove whether the prosecutors
actually took the bribes. Roh was later found not guilty only at the
appeals court. Seungji Ha and Won Sun Choi note:
There is no evidence presented to confirm the falsity
of statement in this court ruling, therefore it is unsure
whether the court examined any evidence on . . .
determining the veracity of the statement. Even if the
prosecutor had [somehow] successfully proven that
the defaming statements were in fact false, it is
necessary for the court to state the evidence it based
its ruling on. 53
Significantly, the court decision focused on whether
Congressman Roh had reasonable bases for his statement—an
52

In this incident, the defendant deduced that Samsung gave money to Ahn
through illegally recorded materials and articles from the press. The
illegally recorded conversation only implies list of names of the
prosecutors who “planned” to receive the money, but the defendant went
further to make a false statement by claiming that the prosecutors on the
list actually “received” money from Samsung. Since the articles from
the press and recorded materials all contain information achieved from
illegal recording, there is no way to prove the authenticity of Roh’s
claim . . . .[T]hough the defendant himself tried to investigate whether
the prosecutors actually received money from Samsung, we shall
conclude that the defendant was fully aware of making false statements.
Seoul Central District Court [Dist. Ct.], 2007Go-Dan2378, Feb. 9, 2009 (S. Kor.), rev’d,
Seoul Central District Court [Dist. Ct.] 2009No520, Dec. 4, 2009 (S. Kor.).
53 Seungji Ha & Won Sun Choi, Burden of Proving Falsity in False Defamation Cases,
6 KOREA U. L. R EV. 31, 36 (2009) (alteration in original).
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impossible demand when Roh was simply engaging in neutral
reportage on the wiretapped conversation and was merely calling for
an investigation into the matter. Even more significantly, the court
ruled against Roh without making a finding that the prosecutors did
not receive the bribes. In a similar case, 54 a citizen was sentenced to
seven months of imprisonment for revealing that a prosecutor had
engaged in illegal dealings with organized criminals to purchase an
expensive property at a low price. Again, the court, without much
evidentiary analysis, simply ruled that Prosecutor Lee did not
committed such offenses. 55
3.

Insult Prosecutions

The crime of insult is also vigorously prosecuted in Korea
with 9,417 prosecutions in 2013 and 4,860 prosecutions in 2010,56
against the U.N. Human Rights Committee’s 2011 General Comment
34, which warned against punishing “statements not subject to
verification,” namely expressions of feelings and opinions. 57 Korea
is not the only such country. However, in Germany, the world’s
capital of insult prosecution, 58 insult is processed as private
prosecution (Privateklage)59 where prosecutors are not involved and
therefore free of political bias. In Japan, the crime is treated lightly
like a civil infraction, involving a maximum fine of 10,000 JPY. 60
Insult law has been also used by government officials to crack
down on the people who shared negative feelings and opinions
against the police. In 2013, out of 9,417 indictments for the crime of
insult, 1,038 of them (a little more than 10%) were for insulting the
police officers. That percentage has only grown as the number of
54

Seoul District Court [Dist. Ct.], 2007GoDan3122, Apr. 24, 2008 (S. Kor.).
Id.
56 2014 K EOMCHAL YEONGAM [2014 PROSECUTORS ’ OFFICE YEAR BOOK] 684–689
(2015), http://www.spo.go.kr/spo/info/issue/spo_history02.jsp?mode=view&board_no=64
&article_no=590945 [http://perma.cc/A49Q-B2U4].
57 U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 37.
58 International Press Institute, supra note 21.
59 Section 374 of German Code of Criminal Procedure makes a Privatklage available,
without any requirement of a prior involvement of public prosecution first, in cases involving:
(1) trespass into the home, (2) insult, (3) bodily harm, (4) threats, (5) corruptibility or actual
corruption in commercial affairs, (6) damage to goods, (7) unfair competition, and (8) a
variety of matters of infringement of intellectual property. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [StPO]
[CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], § 374(1), translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.
de/englisch_stpo/englisch_stpo.html#p2148 [http://perma.cc/D8VH-6A2F].
60 KEIHŌ , supra note 20, art. 15, 231.
55
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indictments for insulting the public officials increased to 1,397 in
2014, which represents a 35% increase from the previous year. 61
These “police insult” cases have been used to suppress participants
of demonstrations and assemblies concerning government policies.
This law has not been vigorously used by the Korean
government for the specific purpose of suppressing criticism of the
government. The reason is that insult is a crime that requires a formal
accusation to be filed with the police by the insulted. The socially
established, who are the likely victims of the insult, have been
deterred from filing such formal accusations for fear that such filing
may trigger negative publicity. However, the presence of insult law
has justified the existence of “candidate insult” law, which practically
bans the constituency from criticizing candidates in emotional tones
or sharing emotional views of candidates with fellow constituents.
4.

Conclusion

The crime of insult, criminal defamation, and “truth
defamation” laws are vigorously enforced by Korean authorities,
despite the warnings of international human rights bodies, including
the U.N. Human Rights Committee that condemned penalizing an act
of making truthful statements as well as using incarceration as a
punishment for defamation in General Comment No. 34 issued in
2011. 62 The Committee specifically recommended in 2015 that
Korea’s law be amended. 63

61 Press Release, MP Park Nam-chun, Jaknyeon Haru 4-Myeong Kkollo Kyeongch’al
Moyokjoe Ch’eop’eolbad-a . . . 1-nyŏn Se 35% Chŭngga [Last Year, Four Persons Per Day
Were Punished for Insulting Public Officials . . . Increased by 35% in One Year], Mar. 26,
2015, http://bit.ly/1FR5YG1 [http://perma.cc/6LCW-RCRD].
62 U.N. Human Rights Comm., supra note 37.
63 U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Rep.
of the Republic of Korea, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/KOR/CO/4 (Dec. 3, 2015), http://tbinternet.
ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fKOR%
2fCO%2f4&Lang=en [http://perma.cc/Q6G4-NLCS].

Published
Published by
by Penn
Penn Law:
Law: Legal
Legal Scholarship
Scholarship Repository,
Repository, 2017
2017

17

University of Pennsylvania Asian Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 4

480

III.

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV .

[Vol. 12

CANDIDATE DEFAMATION AND INSULT LAW AND
PRACTICE
1. Candidate Defamation Law and Practice

Korea’s election law provides a pervasive system of
restrictions on the time and manner of election campaigning. 64 These
restrictions were justified in the name of fairness between richer and
poorer candidates, but the originated under the authoritarian Rhee
Syngman regime in the late 1950s and mimicked the Japanese legal
system.65 A subsequent justification for maintaining this legislation
was to reduce opportunities for corruption and vote-buying. The
efforts of the Central Election Commission (CEC), which enforces
all regulations on election campaigns, and prosecutors are generally
credited with reducing vote-buying. Post-election surveys show that
the percentage of voters who admitted receiving cash, gifts, free
dining, entertainment, or tours before the National Assembly
elections has fallen from double digit percentages in the 1990s to 3%
in 2004 to 1.4% in 2008.66
The Public Official Election Act (POEA) is designed to
temporally circumscribe election campaigns in Korea.67 Article 93 of
the POEA prohibits individuals from distributing or posting
advertisements, letters of greetings, posters, or other printed matter,
“or the like,” supporting or opposing a political party or candidate for
a period of 180 days before the election to the election day. 68 The
statute also generally prohibits any campaign activities before a short,
fourteen-day legal campaign period prior to the National Assembly
and local elections and a twenty-three day period prior to presidential
elections.69 The sole exceptions are for very limited activities, such
as the distribution of name cards, which is allowed from 120 days
before National Assembly elections. 70 Moreover, punishment for
64

Haggard & You, supra note 15, at 171.
Song Seog-Yun, Seon’geo Undong Kyucheippeop eui Yeon weon: 1925-nyeon Ilpon
Pot’ongseon’geopeop eui Seongrip kwa Han’guk Puntanch’eche eui Yuip [The Origin of the
Regulatory Election Campaign Law: Japanese 1925 Election Law and Its Importation into
the Division System of Korea], 46 S EOUL L.J., no. 4, 28, 44–53 (2005).
66 JONG-SUNG YOU, D EMOCRACY, I NEQUALITY, AND CORRUPTION: KOREA, TAIWAN,
AND THE P HILIPPINES COMPARED 112 (2015).
67 Public Official Election Act, supra note 9.
68 Id. art. 93.
69 Id. art. 33, 59.
70 Id. art. 60–63.
65
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derogations is harsh: individuals and civil society organizations
violating these provisions are subject to imprisonment of up to two
years or fines of up to four million won. 71
These restrictions on campaigns produce enormous
incumbent advantage because challengers are unable to effectively
promote themselves before the legal campaign period. Moreover,
there is a troubling trend of incumbents using the advantages of office
to aggressively prosecute opposition candidates, both for the
prohibition on campaigning in the pre-campaign period and on claims
of false election speeches and slander, which work like candidate
defamation and candidate insult, respectively.
The latter set of violations are of particular concern because
of the discretion granted to prosecutors in defining what constitutes
false election speech and slander—even negative campaigns based on
correct information of a candidates’ positions have been deemed
slanderous. As with the punishments under the defamation laws
described in the previous section, the consequences for illegal
campaign speech are grave. The Public Official Election Act
stipulates that anyone who publishes false facts about a candidate and
his or her family for the purpose of defeating the candidate in the
election is punishable by imprisonment of up to seven years or a fine
between five million won and thirty million won. 72 However, even
publication of correct information about a candidate that is deemed
slanderous could be punishable by imprisonment of up to three years
or a fine of up to five million won, although a violator could be
immune from punishment if the publication of the true facts is
subsequently deemed in the public interest. 73
The discretion exercised by prosecutors on when to bring
cases presents a risk of politicization of the prosecutorial process.
Chung Bong-ju, a former National Assembly member and one of
South Korea’s most popular political commentators, was imprisoned
for a full year in late 2011 after being convicted of spreading rumors
about Lee Myung-bak’s connection to an alleged stock fraud during
the 2007 presidential election. 74 The Supreme Court’s ruling for
Chung was criticized by legal scholars as well as opposition parties,
human rights groups, and other civil society organizations, for
71
72
73
74

Id. art. 254(2), 255(2).
Id. art. 250(2).
Id. art. 251.
FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 5, at 467–68.
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discarding the application of the “actual malice” standard and shifting
the burden of proof of falsity of the statements from the prosecution
to the defendant. 75 Although Park Geun-hye raised the same issue of
Lee’s possible connection to the stock fraud scandal during the
campaign for the presidential nomination of the Grand National Party
in 2007, the prosecutors did not investigate her case, indicating
prosecutorial bias.76
After the inauguration of Park Geun-hye as president in
February 2013, a number of people who criticized her as a
presidential candidate, her late father and former president Park
Chung-hee, or her brother Park Ji-man were investigated, detained,
fined, and indicted for false statements even when there was
reasonable evidence that the claims being made were true. Kim Eojun, editor of the online newspaper Ddanzi Ilbo, and Ju Jin-woo were
indicted for raising suspicion about Park Geun-hye’s brother Park Jiman’s involvement in the murder of their nephew in their popular
podcast Naggomsu (“I’m a Petty Trickster”) in June 2013.77 Park
Jeong-gyu was accused by the Election Commission, investigated,
and indicted for posting an article by a Korean-American journalist
that exposed the late president Park Chung-hee’s coercive
recruitment of sex partners based on an interview with a victim who
subsequently immigrated to the United States. 78 Baek Eun-jong,
editor of the Voice of Seoul, was arrested and indicted for posting an
article on a rumor about Park Geun-hye’s illegitimate child. 79
75 Cho Kuk, Ilpu Heowi ka P’ohamdoen Kongcheok Inmul Pip’an eui Peopcheok
Ch’aekim [Legal Responsibility for Partially False Criticism of a Public Figure], 53 S EOUL
L.J., no. 3, 2012, at 175; Kim Jong-cheol, Kongchikseon’geopeop Che-250-cho Che-2-hang
(Nakseonmokcheok Heowisasil Gongp’yojoe) wa Kwallyeonhan Daepeopweon P’ankyeol e
taehan Heonpeopcheok Keomt’o [A Constitutional Review of the Supreme Court Decision
on the Article 250-2 of the Public Official Election Act (False Campaign Speech to Defeat
an Opponent], 22 YONSEI L. REV., no. 1, 2012, at 1.
76 Haggard & You, supra note 15, at 172.
77 Kim Dong-ho, ‘Naggomsu’ Kim Eo-jun-Joo Jin-woo Pulgusok Kiso [‘Naggomsu’
Joo Jin-woo and Kim Eo-jun Indicted Without Detention], YONHAP NEWS (June 13, 2013),
http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2013/06/13/0200000000AKR2013061317
9300004.HTML?input=1179m [https://perma.cc/7FMR-D8D3].
78 Yoon Sung-hyo, ‘Pak Cheong-heui eui Yeo’in’ K’alleom, Peopweon eui P’antan
eun? [A Column on Park Chung-hee’s Sex Partners: What Will Be Court’s Judgment?],
OHMYN EWS (July 16, 2013), http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/view/at_pg.aspx?
cntn_cd=A0001886362 [http://perma.cc/RQB6-4MUT].
79 Lee Eun-jeong, ‘Pak Chi-man Sal’inch’eonggu euihok’ Podo han Paek Eun-chong,
Gusokkiso [‘Paek Eun-jong, Indicted and Detained for Reporting the Suspicion of Park Jiman’s Involvement in a Murder Case], SEGYE ILBO (May 23, 2013), http://www.segye.com/
content/html/2013/05/23/20130523003354.html [http://perma.cc/8YBU-MHLZ].
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This problem was felt even more acutely because the Supreme
Court, 80 while holding the burden of proof over the prosecutors,
recently imposed something like a “burden of production” on the
defendant speaker on the truth/falsity of the statement, for the reason
that election is “too short for a free market of ideas to operate
properly.” Such precedent, of course, does not take into account how
much “untruths” will distort elections if people do not volunteer
information about candidates, albeit with insufficient bases. In that
case, Chung Bong-ju alleged that another politician Lee Myung-bak
was involved in stock price manipulation of a company called BBK.81
Lee Myung-bak later became the President. Once in power, his
prosecutors indicted Chung for candidate defamation. Throughout
the case, the court did not inquire into the truth of the statement and
instead examined whether Jung had sufficient basis to say what he
said. Jung, who merely wanted to cast doubt over Lee Myung-bak’s
financial deals, was not prepared to produce a basis that the judge
now equipped with the benefit of hindsight would find “sufficient.” 82
In comparison, in the United Kingdom, false campaign
speech about a candidate’s personal (as opposed to political)
character or conduct remains a criminal offense, punishable by a fine,
but only the most blatant and serious false statements are likely to

80

Allowing people to cast doubts with insubstantial evidence contradicts
public interest because, even if such doubt has been cleared, the voters
will have been misled by the defamatory statements. Casting doubts on
the candidates’ corruptions should not be allowed without any limitation
even if it aims at checking the candidate’s qualifications for public
offices. Such doubt-casting should be allowed only when there is a
substantial reason to believe that the doubts may be true. However, if the
doubts were based on substantial reasons, one cannot be punished even
if the doubts are later proved to be false.
Supreme Court [S.Ct.], 2001Do6138, Feb. 20, 2003 (S.Kor.).
81 Chico Harlan, In S. Korea, a Shrinking Space for Speech, WASH. POST (Dec. 22,
2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-s-korea-a-shrinking-spacefor-speech/2011/12/21/gIQAmAHgBP_story.html [http://perma.cc/EFB8-VCUU].
82 Cho Guk, Ilbu Heowiga Pohamdoen Gongjeok Inmul Bipaneui Beopcheok Chaegim
[Legal Responsibility for Partially False Criticism of a Public Figure], 53 S EOUL L.J., Sept.
2012, at 175; Kim Jong-cheol, Gongjikseongeobeop Je-250-jo Je-2-hang (Nakseonmokjeok
Heowisasil Gongpyojoe) wa Gwanlyeonhan Daebeopwon Pangyeol-e daehan
Heonbeopjeok Geomto [A Constitutional Review of the Supreme Court Decision on the
Article 250-2 of the Public Official Election Act (False Campaign Speech to Defeat an
Opponent)], 22 YONSEI L. REV., 2012, at 1.
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face prosecution. 83 The May 2010 elections resulted in thirty-seven
allegations of making false statements about a candidate. Of these,
only one case resulted in a conviction. 84 In relation to the June 2009
local and European elections, there were only four alleged cases and
none of them resulted in further action. 85 For further comparison,
Australia repealed its provision about false campaign speech as
criminal offense in 2007, following doubts about the law’s
practicability and consistency with freedom of speech. 86
2. Comparison to Japan and Taiwan
The number of people investigated or indicted for candidate
defamation and candidate insult (represented in the table below as
“false propaganda”) in Korea is overwhelming compared to Taiwan
and Japan.

83 Jacob Rowbottom, Lies, Manipulation and Elections: Controlling False Campaign
Statements, 32 O XFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 507, n.10 (2012).
84 ASS’ NS OF CHIEF POLICE OFFICERS AND ELECTORAL COMMISSION A NALYSIS,
ANALYSIS OF CASES OF ALLEGED E LECTORAL M ALPRACTICE IN 2010 26 (Feb. 2011).
85 ASS’ NS OF CHIEF POLICE OFFICERS AND ELECTORAL COMMISSION A NALYSIS,
ANALYSIS OF A LLEGATIONS OF ELECTORAL M ALPRACTICE AT THE J UNE 2009 ELECTIONS (Jan.
14, 2010). See also Rowbottom, supra note 83, n.10 (examining regulation of false
statements during campaigns).
86 Anne Twomey, Freedom of Political Communication and Its Constitutional Limits
on Electoral Laws, in E LECTORAL D EMOCRACY: A USTRALIAN PROSPECTS 189 (Joo-Cheong
Tham, et al. eds., 2011).
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Table 1. Number and Types of Election Law Prosecutions in Korea 87
15th (1996) 16th (2000) 17th (2004) 18th (2008) 19th (2012)
Investigated

Total

1,995

3,749

3,797

1,990

2,544

14,075

(Indicted)

(713)

(1,552)

(2,829)

(1,283)

(1,448)

(7,825)

(Detained)

(175)

(139)

(423)

(68)

(115)

(920)

Money, gift

667

1,548

1,609

575

828

5,227

(33.4%)

(41.3%)

(42.4%)

(28.9%)

(32.5%)

(37.1%)

287

502

564

400

655

2,408

(14.4%)

(13.4%)

(14.9%)

(20.1%)

(25.7%)

(17.1%)

"Black" propaganda
Illegal propaganda
Violence
Others

90

666

470

272

121

1,619

(4.5%)

(17.8%)

(12.4%)

(13.7%)

(4.8%)

(11.5%)

279

208

105

58

77

727

(14.0%)

(5.5%)

(2.8%)

(2.9%)

(3.0%)

(5.2%)

672

825

1,049

669

863

4,078

(33.7%)

(22.0%)

(27.6%)

(33.6%)

(33.9%)

(29.0%)

Taiwan’s campaign regulation is focused not on restricting
political speech but on preventing vote buying. The table below
indicates that enforcement is concentrated on prosecuting vote
buying cases: about 94% of prosecutions for election-related crimes
represented vote buying. Recall that vote buying cases represented
only 30–40% of total investigations, and candidate defamation/insult
steadfastly increased to a recent high of 25.7% in South Korea. 88
There are no cases of illegal propaganda and relatively few cases of
false propaganda in Taiwan. The standards for prosecution of false
campaign speech seem to impose a higher burden of proof to
prosecutors in Taiwan than in South Korea. In Taiwan, the judiciary
has established “actual malice” standards for criminal defamation,
including defamation of candidates, which requires the prosecutors to
prove both the falsity of the statements and that the defendant made
a false statement knowingly or with reckless disregard. 89 Hence, the
potential for political abuse of prosecuting false campaign speech is
lesser in Taiwan than in South Korea.
87 Haggard and You, supra note 15 (summarizing data from various press releases from
Korea’s Supreme Prosecution Office).
88 See Table 1.
89 Jimmy Chiashin Hsu, Free Speech and Democratic Consolidation in a Divided Polity:
Taiwan's Politics of Rumors and Laws of Defamation, 2000–2008 (Aug. 2009) (unpublished
J.D. dissertation, University of Chicago), http://search.proquest.com/openview/42fa5ef6
33cf6f5ca42125fdd6c0be4b/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y [https://perma.cc/
8PCX-NAYQ].

Published
Published by
by Penn
Penn Law:
Law: Legal
Legal Scholarship
Scholarship Repository,
Repository, 2017
2017

23

University of Pennsylvania Asian Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 4

486

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV .

[Vol. 12

Table 2. Number and Types of Election Law Prosecutions in Taiwan
(Lower Court)
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total (%)*
Money, gift
592
85 335 1,471 522 327 164 996 984 184 5,660 93.8%
False propaganda
32
64
23
24
16
38
23 220 3.6%
Violence
13
10
7
6
1
37 0.6%
Others
4 112
1
1
118 2.0%
Unknown
284
40
72
15
20
2
433 Total
876 125 407 1,531 620 464 188 1,020 1,029 208 6,468 100%

Note: The percentages (last column) denote the proportion of each type of electionrelated crime out of total election-related crimes of which the type is known, for
the period of 2003-2012.
Source: ROC Court statistics, provided by Dr. Bi-ling Kuan (管碧玲), member of
the Legislative Yuan.

The table below presents a comparison of the numbers and
percentages of investigated persons during legislative elections from
1996 to 2012 in Korea and Japan (lower house elections), categorized
by the type of election crime. Note that the total number of
investigated people for election crimes during this period is much
larger in Korea (14,075) than in Japan (5,169). Considering that the
number of House Representatives in Japan (475) is larger than that of
the National Assembly members in Korea (300) and that Japan’s
population (127.3 million in 2013) is much larger that Korea’s (50.2
million in 2013), this shows that prosecution of election crimes is
much more rigorous in Korea. A more striking difference is the
relative proportions of vote buying versus administrative offenses:
while vote buying represents 82% of election crime investigations in
Japan, the equivalent figure in Korea is only 30–40%. The proportion
of people investigated for administrative offences in Japan is just 11%,
but the equivalent figure in Korea is as high as 40.5%. Another
difference is seen in the proportion of prosecution of candidate
defamation (and candidate insult in Korea): 0.1% in Japan but 17.1%
in Korea.
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Table 3. Numbers and Types of Election Law Prosecutions in Korea
and Japan 1996–201290

Investigated
(Detained)
Vote buying
Infringement of freedom
(interference, violence,---)
False campaign speech
(candidate defamation/insult in Korea)
Illegal campaign & others
(administrative offences)

Japan
5,169
(991)
4,236
82.0%
375
7.3%
5
0.1%
553
11%

Korea
14,075
(920)
5,227
37.1%
727
5.2%
2,408
17.1%
5,697
40.5%

Note: Japan’s statistics are for six general elections from the 41 st (1996) to 46th
(2012) House of Representatives. Korea’s statistics are for five general elections
from the 15th (1996) to 19th (2012) National Assembly. Infringement on electoral
freedom in Japan includes interference in voting, illegal voting, violence, etc.
Infringement on electoral freedom in Korea denotes violence only. False campaign
speech in Korea includes slander of candidate based on true facts, which is however
used by prosecutors and courts as “candidate insult.” “Others” in Korea may
include some violations that are classified as “infringement of electoral freedom”
in Japan.

3. Candidate Insult Law
As explained earlier, candidate insult law is the prosecutors’
and courts’ adaptation of a provision in election law that punishes
statement of facts designed to undermine a candidate’s campaign. On
its face, it reads like a truth defamation provision. If it were really
treated as such, it likely would be the world’s only legislation banning
statements of facts in election periods when all statements of truth
about candidates should be deemed to be in the public interest.
Probably, due to the courts’ reluctance to let that happen, the
provision is being used as candidate insult law.
Recently, there was one exceptional case where the
prosecutor tried to use candidate insult law as truth defamation of a
candidate. A prominent poet was found guilty of this provision for
90

Jong-song You, The Politics of Electoral Campaign Regulation in South Korea and
Japan: Similar but Different?, (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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alleging that the then Presidential candidate Park Geun-Hye had
custody of calligraphy by Ah Joong-geun, an independence fighter
who assassinated Ito Hirobumi, the Japanese prince who spearheaded
the annexation of Chosun. 91 Although the judgment was later
reversed on the grounds that, where falsity has not been proven, the
poet had the public interest in mind in making the claims, 92 the
demonstrated legal risk cast a chilling shadow on anyone who may
reveal inconvenient truths.
At any rate, most of the prosecutions under this provision
involve epithets against candidates. They are indicted and tried like
“candidate insult” law, and they account for about half of the false
speech cases in Korea.

IV.

ANALYSIS OF C ANDIDATE DEFAMATION AND INSULT
1. Research Method

This Article attempts to identify if there is evidence that
prosecutors’ decisions to indict were influenced by the consideration
of protecting the ruling party candidates. We propose three different
methods of testing this hypothesis. All 850 candidate defamation
court cases and 719 candidate insult court cases decided during the
twenty-year period from 1995–2015 were obtained for analysis.
Firstly, we compare the number of prosecutions initiated for
protecting the ruling party candidates compared to the opposition
candidates. Korean prosecutors can indict sua sponte or upon receipt
of criminal complaints filed. 93 Therefore, the difference in the
numbers can depend on other factors, such as people’s willingness to
file criminal complaints on election-related statements or people’s
greater willingness to make critical comments on the ruling party
candidates in a more vocal and risky fashion, which we cannot control.
However, assuming that these attitudinal factors are not significant,
91 Nam Hyun-woo, Poet Ahn Found Partially Guilty, KOREA TIMES (Nov. 7, 2013),
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2013/11/116_145842.html [http://perma.
cc/6NCE-96AV].
92 An To-hyeon Si’in, Kongchikseon’geopeop Wiban 2 simseo ‘Mujoe’ [Poet An Tohyŏn, ‘Not Guilty’ on 2 Counts of Violation of Public Official Election Act], YONHAP N EWS
(Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/politics/2014/03/25/0505000000AKR 2014
0325076451055.HTML [http://perma.cc/VZN6-A4LN].
93 Hyeongbeop [Criminal Procedure Act], Act No. 341, Sept. 23, 1954, amended by
Act. No. 14179, May 29, 2016, art. 257 (S. Kor.)
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this study provides a rough outlook on prosecutorial practice, though
falsifiable upon proof the aforesaid factors.
Secondly, we can use the judgments issued on the indictments
as a measure of rectitude of the indictments. The assumption here is
that the courts are independent and can evaluate the substance of the
indictments efficiently. If the frequency of “not guilty” judgments is
higher for the indictments protecting the ruling party candidates
compared to opposition candidates, it is a sign that the former group
of indictments was the result of prosecutorial willingness to indict the
statements attacking the ruling party candidates.
Thirdly, we can look at how the prosecutors respond to the
cases presented to them through criminal complaints, requests for
investigation, etc. There is no public record of criminal complaints
or requests for investigations, filed by private individuals, but a
record of the same exists as filed by the Central Election Commission.
If the prosecutors were more likely to indict the statements attacking
the ruling party, that can be evidence of prosecutorial bias. This
Article concludes that all three methods showed prosecutorial bias.
2. Frequency of Pro-Ruling-Party Prosecutions
To take an example from the latest presidential elections in
2012, the number of indictments initiated upon statements attacking
the ruling party candidates outnumber the ones attacking the
opposition candidates by wide margins (i.e., 87% vs. 13%).
Table 4. Number of All Candidate Defamation/Insult Cases in the
2012 Presidential Election

Ruling Party
Candidate
Ruling Party
(Primary)
Opposition
Candidates
Total

Slander

False

Total

(Proportion)

84

69

153

86.4%

1

0

1

0.6%

13

10

23

13.0%

98

79

177

100.0%

Note: appellate levels are counted separately.
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The table below shows that the proportion of ruling party
candidate-involved trial cases changed from 76.5% in 2002 to 14.5%
in 2007 to 87% in 2012 presidential election. The 2007 presidential
election number initially appears to be exceptional at 14.5%.
However, it should be kept in mind that indictment decisions are
usually made after the election, and in 2007, the ruling party changed
when the opposition candidate Lee Myung-bak won the election
converting all the non-ruling party candidates into the “ruling”
category. Therefore, the 2007 numbers are eminently consistent with
this Article’s postulate about prosecutorial bias. Thus, we can infer
that the prosecution always showed political bias in favor of the
president elect.
Table 5. Number of Trials and Convictions for Presidential Elections,
by Attacked Candidate’s Party Affiliation

2002

2007

2012

Ruling

Non-Ruling

Total

(Ruling ratio)

Trial cases

13

4

17

76.5%

Convictions

7

4

11

63.6%

(Conviction rate)

53.9%

100%

64.7%

Trial cases

39

230

269

14.5%

Convictions

33

200

233

14.2%

(Conviction rate)

84.6%

87.0%

86.6%

Trial cases

154

23

177

87.0%

Convictions

102

15

117

87.2%

(Conviction rate)

66.2%

65.2%

66.1%

Note: Saenuri (GNP) was an opposition in the 2002 and 2007 presidential election,
but a ruling party in the 2012 election. Saenuri candidates won the 2007 and 2012
elections.

3. Rate of Not-Guilty in Pro-Ruling-Party Prosecutions vs.
Pro-Opposition Prosecutions
The dependent variable, “Not Guilty,” takes a value of one if
the court ruling is either “not guilty” or “suspended sentence.” This
Article treats suspended sentence as practically equivalent to a “not
guilty” sentence because most criminal defendants and attorneys treat
it that way. Our logit regression analysis identifies if and how much
the probability of a “Not Guilty” ruling is influenced by various
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independent variables. Our choice of independent variables is limited
by the data. We do not and cannot include the characteristics the
defendants, except for hiring of private lawyers (“Private”). The
copies of court sentences we obtained do not allow identification of
the defendants by categories such as their party affiliation and
demographic variables, except for occupations that are not
standardized and hence not useful for statistical analysis. Fortunately,
for most cases, we can identify the candidates who were attacked by
the defendants associated with “true but slanderous expressions” or
“release of false factual information” about the candidates. By
including the characteristics of the candidates who were attacked
such as their party affiliation (“Ruling party” and the major
conservative “Saenuri” party, or its antecedent, the Grand National
Party), incumbency at the time of attack (“Incumbent”), and success
or failure at the subsequent election (“Elected”), we can examine
whether those defendants who attacked the ruling party candidates,
incumbent candidates, and elected candidates are more or less likely
to get “Not Guilty” sentences than those who attacked opposition or
independent candidates, non-incumbent candidates, and unsuccessful
candidates.
The table below shows the results of logistic regressions for
the entire sample (column 1), the non-presidential sample (column 2);
and the presidential sample (the cases in which the attacked
candidates were presidential candidates) (column 3). Note that the
average probability of receiving a “Not Guilty” sentence is 21.9% for
the cases of defamation via false information (“Defamation”) and
23.2% for the cases of slander via true information (“Insult”). We’ve
included the variable “Defamation” to see if there is a systemic
difference in the probability of “Not Guilty” between these different
types of candidate defamation, but the coefficients for “Defamation”
are insignificant in all three columns.
In columns 1 (entire sample) and 2 (non-presidential sample),
the coefficients for “Ruling party” are positive and highly significant
(at 0.1% level for the entire sample and at 1% level for the nonpresidential sample). This means that the defendants who attacked
ruling party candidates are significantly more likely to receive “Not
Guilty” sentences than those who attacked opposition or independent
candidates. It is hard to imagine that Korean courts favor opposition
and independent candidates over ruling party candidates; instead, the
significantly positive coefficients for “Ruling party” are perhaps due
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to the fact that these indictments are due to prosecutorial bias. When
prosecutors have too vigorously indicted anyone who attacked ruling
party candidates (including rather minor offenses), the court’s
unbiased decisions, or less biased decisions, will make the
coefficients positive. Interestingly, the coefficients for “Saenuri” (or
GNP) are negative, although they are statistically not significant.
When we consider combined effects of “Ruling party” and “Saenuri,”
the probability of “Not Guilty” increases more for those who have
attacked non-Saenuri ruling party candidates than those who have
attacked Saenuri candidates when the party was in power.
Note that the conservative Saenuri (and its antecedent GNP)
has been the ruling party before February 1998, and again since
February 2008 under presidents Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013) and
Park Geun-hye (2013–present). The major liberal parties were in
power under presidents Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) and Roh Moohyun (2003–2008). Korean presidents have a five-year single term
limit, and their term begins and ends in late February.
On the other hand, the coefficients for “Elected” are negative
and significant (at 5% level for the entire sample and at 0.1% level
for the non-presidential sample). The defendants are less likely to
get “Not Guilty” sentences when the candidates they had attacked
have been elected than when the attacked candidates have not been
elected. The significantly negative effect of “Elected” probably
reflects a court bias in favor of protecting the powerful. Note that the
coefficients for “Incumbent” are very small and insignificant. Thus,
what matters is not whether the attacked candidate was an incumbent
at the time of the attack but whether the attacked candidate wins the
subsequent election. In other words, the effect of incumbency status
of the attacked candidates differs depending on the time: incumbency
status prior to the contested election (and prior to court trials) has no
effect, but incumbency status post-election (at the time of court trials)
has a significant effect on court rulings.
Considering the effects of the four variables—”Ruling party,”
“Saenuri,” “Incumbent,” and “Elected”—together, the probability of
a “Not Guilty” ruling is greatest when the attacked candidate was a
non-Saenuri ruling party candidate (i.e., the Democratic or Woori
candidate between February 1998 and February 2008) who lost the
election. That probability is the lowest when the attacked candidate
was a Saenuri (or GNP) candidate between February 1998 and
February 2008 who won the election, followed those who attacked a
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Saenuri (or GNP) candidate after February 2008, who won the
election.
However, the effects of these variables differ somewhat when
we look at the presidential sample. “Ruling party” is not significant,
but the “Saenuri” effect is large and negative (significant at 1% level)
and the effect of “Elected” is large and positive (significant at 5%
level). This different pattern for the cases of attacking presidential
candidates can be understood, by considering the large number of
cases in the 2007 presidential election. During the election, GNP was
the main opposition party, but then-president Roh Moo-hyun was a
lame duck. In fact, there were much higher numbers of indictments
for those who attacked the opposition candidates Park Geun-hye who
lost the GNP nomination (thirty-two “slander” cases plus eighteen
“false” cases) and Lee Myung-bak, who were eventually successful
in the election (138 “slander” cases and forty-two “false” cases) than
for those who attacked the ruling party candidates, such as Chung
Dong-young (nineteen “slander” cases plus two “false” cases). Note
that this kind of change in ruling party after the election did not take
place for elections other than the presidential election.
Also, the negative effect of “Saenuri” and positive effect of
“Elected” are negated for Saenuri candidates who have been elected,
such as Lee Myung-bak in the 2007 presidential election and Park
Geun-hye in the 2012 presidential election. Considering the effects
of the three variables—”Ruling party,” “Saenuri,” and “Elected”—
together, the probability of a “Not Guilty” ruling is the greatest when
the attacked candidate was a non-Saenuri party candidate who won
the election, which practically means Roh Moo-hyun in the 2002
presidential election. Indeed, of the thirteen cases that involved
slander of candidate Roh Moo-hyun, six cases, or 46%, got “Not
Guilty” rulings, a significantly higher rate than the average “Not
Guilty” probability of 23% for the slander cases. Note that
“Incumbent” is not included in the logit regression for the presidential
sample because there can be no incumbent candidates in presidential
elections in Korea due to the single-term limit.
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Table 6. Logit Regression Results for Entire, Non, Presidential, and
Presidential Samples

Court
Private

E_LEVEL
E_YEAR
Ruling party
Saenuri
Incumbent

Entire sample

Non-presidential

Presidential

0.2554

0.0457

0.6057

*

(0.1114)

(0.1339)

0.2244

0.4190

(0.1570)

(0.2033)

0.2087

*

(0.1829)

-0.0332

-0.0666

(0.0188)

(0.0204)
***

FALSE
Constant

-0.0688
(0.3078)

0.6554

***

0.2052

**

-0.1697

(0.2117)

(0.3810)

-0.2179

-0.1229

-2.1143

(0.1693)

(0.2134)

(0.8079)

-0.0579

-0.0250

-0.3088

**

(0.0659)

(0.1569)

(0.1618)
Elected

(0.2016)
*

0.2200

(0.1062)

0.8038

**

**

(0.1736)
*

-0.5950

***

1.9569

(0.1493)

(0.1808)

(0.8817)

-0.0332

-0.0220

0.0396

(0.1581)

(0.1875)

64.388

131.861

*

(0.2987)
***

-414.061

(37.829)

(41.088)

(132.343)

N
Log
pseudolikelihood

1215
619.76379

892
438.30238

323
162.86688

Pseudo R2

0.0407

0.0539

0.1047

**

Note: Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses below the coefficients.
Significance levels are denoted as follows: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001.
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4. Prosecutors’ Treatment of Cases Referred by Central
Election Commission
Table 7. Rate of Indictment on Cases Referred by Central Election
Commission in 2012 Presidential Election
Cases
Referred

Rate

Indictment

No
Indictment

Rate of
Indictment

Ruling Party

15

55.6%

9

6

60.0%

Opposition 1

8

29.6%

3

5

37.5%

Opposition 2
Opposition
Total

4

14.8%

3

1

75.0%

12

44.4%

6

6

50.0%

27

100%

15

12

55.6%

As shown in the table above, prosecutors were 10% more
likely to indict statements attacking the ruling party candidate than
the statements attacking the opposition candidates.

V.

CONCLUSION

This empirical study confirms that prosecutors are likely to
use their indictment power in favor of ruling party candidates than
opposition candidates in prosecuting candidate defamation cases and
candidate insult cases. Extrapolating the candidate defamation/ insult
cases to general defamation/insult cases, the results show that South
Korea has reason to mull over whether to adopt the international
standard of abolishing or effectively retiring criminal defamation and
insult laws.
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